This paper examines how a firm's financial distress and the legal environment regarding the ease of bankruptcy reorganization can alter product market competition and supplier-buyer relationships. We identify three effects, predation, bail-out, and abetment, that can change firms' behavior from their actions in the absence of financial distress. The predation effect increases competition before potential bankruptcy as the non-distressed competitor behaves as if it has some first-mover advantage, which could benefit a supplier with price control. The bailout effect reflects the supplier's incentive to grant the distressed firm concessions to preserve competition, improving supply chain efficiency and providing support for the exclusivity rule in Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code when the supplier and the distressed firm are financially linked. The abetment effect is that the supplier may deliberately abet the competitor's predation, leading to increased operational disadvantages for the distressed firm before bankruptcy. Together these effects stress that a firm's bankruptcy potential can hurt its competitors and benefit its suppliers/customers.
Introduction
Bankruptcy is a critical business decision in which firms declare their inability to meet their financial obligations and obtain protection from creditors. Contrary to public opinion, bankruptcy is not the demise of the filing company. Instead, many jurisdictions around the world offer two alternatives to bankrupt firms: liquidation and reorganization. While liquidation indeed brings the bankrupt company to an end, bankruptcy reorganization is a process designed to provide operationally sound firms with relief from their financial burdens and to continue operating. As an example, bankruptcy in the United States is largely governed by The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which * The previous version is titled "The Impact of Bankruptcy Reorganization on Operational Competitiveness and Supply Chain Performance".
Given its significant economic and social impact, bankruptcy has been an important research topic among scholars in law and economics, who mainly focus on the behavior of different stakeholders within the bankrupt firm. However, bankruptcy not only concerns the firm facing bankruptcy risk, but also other parties in its supply chain. The interaction between bankruptcy and supply chain dynamics is a two-way street: not only could one firm's (potential) bankruptcy have a profound influence on the decisions and performance of other parties in its supply chain, supply chain interactions can also affect the distressed firm's risk of bankruptcy and the bankruptcy outcome.
In danger of losing a major customer due to bankruptcy liquidation, a supplier often grants significant concessions to its customer to reduce bankruptcy risk or increase the chance of reorganization. For example, as documented by Gilson (2010) , Cardinal Health, "which supplied Kmart with most of its prescription drugs and account for $3 billion in sales in 2002," was forced to "provide more favorable pricing and terms" as Kmart was reorganized under Chapter 11. Similarly, Bower and Gilson (2003) claims that United Airlines "have reduced its aircraft lease payments by 50% through reorganization." In addition to companies that supply physical products to the downstream firm, one can also view labor unions as suppliers, a perspective used in the labor economics and industrial organization literature since most labor negotiation concerns a fixed wage contract (Davidson 1988, Horn and Wolinsky 1988) . Indeed, the outcome of labor negotiation often significantly influences whether a heavily unionized company can be sufficiently reorganized.
For example, having more than 90% of its employees belonging to two unions, Hostess filed for bankruptcy twice since 2009 mainly due to conflict with the labor unions. The company was eventually liquidated when an agreement with the unions could not be reached (Palank et al. 2012 , Feintzeig 2013 ). American Airlines, on the other hand, was able to successfully reorganize partially thanks to the "deep concession from labor unions that helped it cut about $1 billion in annual labor costs" (Palank 2014) .
One company's bankruptcy may have a mixed impact on its competitors. On one hand, industry experts argue that Best Buy enjoyed market share gains when its rival Circuit City went bankrupt and was eventually liquidated in 2009 (Reagan 2013) . On the other hand, better terms offered by suppliers in reorganization could potentially put a bankrupt firm in an advantageous position in competition. For example, Esterl (2010) reports that the labor cost per available seat mile for American Airlines, the only US legacy airline which had not filed for Chapter 11 by that time, was 4.30 cents in 2010, while its main rivals that had been successfully reorganized in bankruptcy had reduced their costs to 3.30 -3.60 cents per available seat mile through bankruptcy reorganization.
This cost disadvantage eventually led to the bankruptcy of American Airlines in November 2011.
Similarly, Zhang (2010) provides empirical evidence that a bankrupt firm normally re-emerges as a stronger competitor after being successfully reorganized. These impacts are also likely to influence market competition before bankruptcy. For example, Chevalier (1995) finds that highly levered supermarkets face more intense competition as competitors attempt to benefit from the levered firms' financial vulnerability.
Further, in some concentrated industries, distressed and non-distressed competitors commonly share some important suppliers. For example, both Borders and Barnes & Noble relied on the same major publishing houses for books. Similarly, Circuit City and Best Buy both sourced from electronics manufacturers such as Hewlett-Packard and Samsung. In addition, the United Automobile Workers (UAW) provides workforces to General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. Similar relationships exist between US legacy airlines and their unions.
Motivated by the above phenomenon, this paper focuses on the supply chain effects of bankruptcy, that is, how the bankruptcy potential of one firm affects the operational strategies and performance of all parties in its supply chain through supply chain interactions. To achieve this goal, we build a two-period supply chain model with three strategic players: two competing downstream firms and a common supplier. Different from the classic supply chain models, one of the downstream firms is financially distressed and may file for bankruptcy at the end of the first period. In the event of bankruptcy, we abstract away from modeling the conflict between the firm and its creditors and emphasize the operational implications of reorganization by modeling bankruptcy reorganization as an instantaneous process with a random cost. The distribution of the random cost of reorganization can be seen as a proxy of the friendliness of a jurisdiction toward reorganization and/or the complexity of the bankrupt firm's debt structure.
Using this model, we identify three supply chain effects of bankruptcy: the predation effect, the bail-out effect, and the abetment effect. Depending on the cost of reorganization and supply chain interactions, these effects alter the ex ante and ex post behavior of different firms in the supply chain, and hence influence the firms' profitability and consumer surplus.
Originating from its incentive to gain the monopoly position, the predator effect induces the non-distressed firm to compete aggressively before bankruptcy, hurting the distressed firm. The competitor benefits from this effect when facing passive suppliers. As the supplier gains more pricing power, the supplier extracts this benefit and the non-distressed competitor may be hurt.
The supplier's fear of losing one sales channel motivates the bail-out effect. The supplier hence grants concessions to the distressed firm both before and after bankruptcy. This effect essentially redistributes the cost related to bankruptcy among different parties, benefiting the distressed firm and harming the supplier and possibly the non-distressed firm.
Finally, the abetment effect comes from the supplier's incentive to profit more from the nondistressed firm. This effect pushes the distressed firm into bankruptcy, benefiting the non-distressed firm but harming the distressed firm and consumers.
This work carries important managerial and policy implications. It alerts managers that when facing a distressed competitor or buyer, it is important to understand how supply chain effects can alter firms' competitiveness and profitability before and after bankruptcy and take advantage of the financial situation when possible. From the competitor's perspective, facing a distressed competitor may not be beneficial. Similarly, a distressed firm may actually benefit the supplier when there is downstream competition. From the distressed firm's perspective, although this model assumes that the distressed firm's financial situation is public information, it may not always be the case in practice. Therefore, managers of a distressed firm should downplay or disclose the firm's financial situation depending on the supply chain dynamics and the legal environment it operates in.
For the policy perspective, this paper stresses that supply chain interactions play a crucial role in the effectiveness of bankruptcy law. It shows that firms in a country with more reorganizationfriendly bankruptcy law have a competitive advantage over their international competitors. A carefully designed bankruptcy mechanism improves supply chain efficiency. Imposing a uniform pricing constraint when downstream firms are in different financial situations can hurt consumers, which may justify relaxing pricing regulations such as the Robinson-Patman Act.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Related literature is summarized in Section 2. We set up the model in Section 3. Sections 4 to 6 introduce the three supply chain effects and analyze their influences on the operational decisions and performances of different parties in the chain. We discuss the implication of the constraint of uniform pricing in Section 7. Section 8 summarizes the managerial insights and discusses policy implications and possible further research.
The appendix includes a list of notation and all proofs.
Literature Review
Aiming to examine how supply chain interactions influence the ex ante and ex post impact of bankruptcy on operational decisions and supply chain performance, we build on a diverse literature that explores corporate bankruptcy in different disciplines. For details of the current U.S. bankruptcy code and the changes in legal status that take place during the bankruptcy process, we refer to White (1989) , Gilson (1990) , Senbet and Seward (1995) , Kordana and Posner (1999) , and the references therein. In addition, Weiss and Wruck (1998) and Gilson (2010) provide excellent case studies of both successful and failed reorganizations.
In the operations management literature, operational decisions of firms that are financially constrained have received increased attention recently. For single firms' operational decisions with financing concerns, see Buzacott and Zhang (2004) , Xu and Birge (2004) , Caldentey and Haugh (2006) , Boyabatlı and Toktay (2011) , Alan and Gaur (2011) , and references therein. Foley et al. (2012) and Craig and Raman (2013) discuss the current practice of retail liquidation and propose several operational improvements based on sophisticated mathematical programming techniques.
In the context of the influence of the downstream firm's financial distress on supply chain performance, to which this paper is closely related, most papers study single-period supply chain models with one upstream party and one downstream party. Zhou and Groenevelt (2008) and Kouvelis and Zhao (2010) examine supply chain performance when the downstream firm is financially constrained and only bank financing is available. Lai et al. (2009) compares different trade modes when both supply chain parties are financially constrained. Kouvelis and Zhao (2012) and Yang and Birge (2009) show supply chain efficiency can be improved when a distressed firm receives financing from its supplier. Federgruen and Wang (2010) examines different supplier financing mechanisms in a multi-period supply chain model. In contrast to this literature's emphasis on interactions between operational decisions and financing choices, we take financing as given with a downstream firm in financial distress and focus on the impact of bankruptcy driven by supply chain interactions.
Researchers have also studied supply chain models in which the buyer mitigates its supplier's default risk via operational and financial means. Swinney and Netessine (2009) , for example, studies a model where one buyer sources from two ex ante identical suppliers who are prone to bankruptcy.
They show that long-term commitments induce the buyer to pay a higher price to the supplier, hence lowering the supplier's default risk. Using a multi-period model with one supplier and one manufacturer, Babich (2010) shows that when sourcing from a distressed supplier, the manufacturer's capacity reservation and financial subsidy decisions can be independently made and that the financial subsidy follows a classic up-to structure. In a similar vein, we find that the supplier may bail out the distressed firm both before and after bankruptcy. However, by modeling downstream competition, we find the supplier may also have the incentive to abet the competitor's predation and push the distressed firm into bankruptcy.
Our paper is also related to the line of research on the impact of supply chain structure on operational decisions and supply chain efficiency. Netessine and Zhang (2005) studies the implication of externalities among different retailers on supply chain design and inventory management. Babich et al. (2007) shows that in a supply chain with unreliable suppliers, when wholesale prices are endogenously determined by suppliers, retailers may prefer suppliers with high default correlations due to more intense price competition. Similarly, we find that a distressed buyer can become a positive externality for the supplier in the presence of downstream competition. Swinney et al. (2011) finds that when competing with a risk-neutral established firm, a startup firm whose objective is to maximize its survival probability may enter an uncertain market earlier. This work, which is also based on asymmetry downstream competition, finds the non-distressed firm could benefit from its rival's financial distress even before bankruptcy. Wadecki et al. (2012) finds that the subsidy the manufacturers provide to their distressed suppliers depends on the supply chain structure. Our paper also shows that supply chain interactions play an important role in the profitability of all firms in the supply chain both before and after bankruptcy.
Scholars in law and economics have provided in-depth analyses of different bankruptcy rules that affect firm operations. Baird and Picker (1991) , Bebchuk and Chang (1992) , and Kordana and Posner (1999) use different game-theoretical models to capture the bargaining process between manager-shareholders and creditors in the bankruptcy process and examine various rules in the current U.S. bankruptcy code such as automatic stay and exclusivity.
1 The focus of these papers is mainly the distributional effect of bankruptcy, that is, how the value of the bankrupt firm is distributed between shareholders and different classes of creditors. However, our paper argues that costly bankruptcy induces different operational strategies and may even create value in some circumstances. In this sense, we show that the operational efficiency of a supply chain could actually be improved by introducing a financial inefficiency, namely the cost of reorganization.
Economists have also studied the supplier's role when facing a buyer with bankruptcy risk.
Among these studies, Perotti and Spier (1993) shows that firms can use leverage to gain bargaining power against labor unions. Wilner (2000) argues that trade creditors may be willing to grant more concessions when the debtor is in financial distress. The supplier in our model could play a similar role. However, by including downstream competition into the model, we find that the supplier may be better off when facing a distressed buyer and that the supplier may push the distressed firm into bankruptcy. Finally, recent papers including François and Morellec (2004) and Broadie et al. (2007) explicitly capture the impact of reorganization and liquidation and use structural default models to assess default probability, as well as debt and equity values. While also modeling reorganization and liquidation options explicitly, our paper focuses on endogenous operational decisions and supply chain interactions, which are not discussed in the above papers.
The Model
Consider a supply chain with two competing downstream firms with a common supplier that operate over two periods. 
The financial distress and bankruptcy process
The distressed firm's road to bankruptcy is illustrated in Figure 1 . At the beginning of the first period (the pre-bankruptcy period), the firm has net asset (asset minus liability) A. Its cash flow during the first period consists of two components. First, the operational profit π d 1 that is determined by the operational decisions of the distressed firm and other firms in its supply chain; 3 2 We model the asymmetry between the two downstream firms as dispersion of capital structures among firms within an industry, which is commonly observed and empirically documented. For example, Almazan and Molina (2005) finds that industries that are older and more concentrated exhibit greater intra-industry dispersion.
3 As we mainly focus on large bankrupt companies which have some market power, we assume that although the firm faces bankruptcy risk, it has sufficient cash to support its operations in either period. Indeed, in its letter to suppliers, American Airlines (2011) states that "(it) is going into Chapter 11 process with what it anticipates to be more than sufficient liquidity in cash and short term investments, as well as cash generated from operations." and second, a random shockα ∈ (−∞, +∞) that captures the firm's profit from other lines of business, uncertainties in fixed operational cost (legal liability, trading loss, etc.) and/or random movement of the firm's asset value. Similar assumptions on random shocks are used by Babich (2010), Hortaçsu et al. (2011), and Tanrisever et al. (2012) to model firms' financial distress. The shockα follows cumulative distribution function F (·) and probability density function f (·). As bankruptcy is associated with the low realization ofα, we assume that F (·) is convex in the region that we are interested in.
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After π d 1 andα are realized, the firm makes the bankruptcy decision. Specifically, assuming that the firm could obtain additional financing against its second-period profit without bankruptcy π d c (the subscript c represents continuation), it files for bankruptcy if and only if the firm's total net liability at the end of the first period,
where
is the bankruptcy threshold. The probability of bankruptcy Ψ = F (α b ). In bankruptcy, the firm first attempts to negotiate with other stakeholders, including creditors and suppliers, in a costly reorganization process. This cost associated with reorganization includes re-financing cost, legal costs, the costs to coordinate creditors, losses incurred in asset sales used to fund operations, and so forth. Empirical evidence suggests that these costs are significant and highly variable. For example, Weiss (1990) reports that the direct cost of bankruptcy ranges from 2.0% to 63.6% of the market value of equity. Finally, it is known that reorganization is an extremely complicated and involved process controlled by the management of the firm, making it difficult for other parties to observe the exact cost. To capture these features, we assume that to be successfully reorganized (with subscript r), the bankrupt firm incurs a random cost of reorganizationC r ∈ [0, +∞), following CDF G(·) and PDF g(·). The distribution ofC r is influenced by factors such as whether a jurisdiction is friendly to reorganization and the complexity of the firm's debt structure.
For example, firms filing for bankruptcy in the United States should face a stochastically smaller reorganization cost than firms in many European countries. While the distribution ofC r is known to all parties, only the management of the bankrupt firm receives an accurate signal of the realized cost of reorganization C r before the second period operational decisions are made by all parties.
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The firm decides to reorganize or liquidate depending on whether whether C r is smaller than the firm's operating profit under reorganization π 7 In this sense, the distressed firm's first-period decision is independent of its bankruptcy risk. While this is an abstraction from reality, it is a desirable property in the model, as it allows us to attribute all deviations of the firm's decision from the benchmark without bankruptcy, which we characterize in Section 3.3, to supply chain interactions, hence isolating the supply chain effect of bankruptcy.
Supply chain interactions
The distressed firm does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it earns profits while interacting with competitors, which influence the demand faced by the distressed firm, and suppliers, which influence the distressed firms' input prices. Anticipating the impact of bankruptcy and the cost of reorganization on them, competitors and suppliers adjust their operational decisions, which in turn influence the distressed firm's operational decisions and profits of all firms in the supply chain.
We consider both horizontal and vertical supply chain interactions. Horizontally, we introduce a non-distressed firm that engages in Cournot competition with the distressed firm in the same product market (with superscript n) for both periods. 8 As argued by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) , Cournot competition is appropriate when modeling competition between firms who have to precommit quantities. In the examples that motivate this study, most quantities, including labor, long-term leases, and inventory, need to be pre-committed. In the first period, facing wholesale prices w 
Along the vertical dimension, we introduce a supplier (with superscript s) that sells to both downstream firms and consider three scenarios based on the supplier's pricing power. In the first scenario (passive supply), the supplier is passive in the sense that the wholesale prices are exogenously determined and independent of the firms' financial situations. That is, w 
In the paper, we assume the products the two firms produce are perfect substitutes. Additional analysis shows that all qualitative insights remain valid when we adopt a differentiated Cournot model as in Singh and Vives (1984) . fuel in the airline industry. This case allows us to isolate the interaction between competitors and serves as a benchmark for the following two cases.
The second scenario (endogenous differentiated pricing) assumes that, as the Stackelberg leader, the supplier makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of different wholesale prices w . Admittedly, in practice, firms interact with suppliers with and without pricing powers simultaneously. For example, in the airline industry, airlines purchase fuel from a competitive market, in which the price is not influenced by the companies' financial situation, and also contract with labor unions that have strong bargaining power over the company. Similarly, in the automobile industry, the manufacturers purchase from smaller suppliers and contract with unionized labor. In the retail industry, retailers share large suppliers such as P&G and contract from small local suppliers. By examining three representative scenarios, our model sheds light on these practical cases.
Finally, note that while the paper assumes that the market demand function, or equivalently, customers' valuation, is not influenced by the firms' financial situation, it does measure the impact of bankruptcy on consumer welfare by evaluating expected consumer surplus, which also illuminates the efficiency of different bankruptcy mechanisms and other policies. 9 Offering different prices to different buyers may be perceived as a violation of the price discrimination provisions under the Robinson-Patman Act. However, price differentiation is a form of anti-trust violation only if it harms consumer welfare. Further, recent research on anti-trust law (Antitrust Modernization Commission 2007) suggests that restricting price discrimination is seen as being less and less effective. It does not protect small businesses, as was its initial aim. Also, it is seen as inconsistent with other antitrust law as it restricts price and other forms of competition. Empirical evidence (Luchs et al. 2010 ) also shows that the likelihood that a court finds a defendant guilty of violating the Robinson-Patman Act has dropped dramatically in recent years. Interestingly, comparing results in Sections 6 and 7, we find that allowing price differentiation may benefit consumers.
The no-distress benchmark
As discussed at the beginning of the section, a key driver in the model is the distressed firm's bankruptcy risk. To quantify the impact of bankruptcy, we first establish a benchmark in which the the distressed firm's bankruptcy risk is zero, which we call the no-distress benchmark. To simplify the notation, we use the subscript a to represent first-period quantities under this benchmark. For example, π d a is the distressed firm's first-period profit under the no-distress benchmark. It is obvious that under this benchmark, the two periods can be decomposed. Simple analysis shows that facing w Further, we note that the above benchmark can also be achieved when the cost of reorganization is zero, that is, Pr(C r = 0) = 1. Proposition 1. When reorganization is costless, all decisions under any supply chain structure are the same under the no-distress benchmark.
As the cost of reorganization is the only source of financial market imperfection, the above result is consistent with the seminal irrelevance result of Modigliani and Miller (1958) , which states that a firm's value is independent of its capital structure in a perfect financial market.
The Predation Effect with Passive Supply
Starting with the scenario with passive supply, we conduct the analysis backward in time. When the distressed firm is in bankruptcy, it first tries to reorganize. Under wholesale prices w d r and w n r , the two downstream firms' order quantities are:
which lead to the corresponding operational profits π Combining the impact of q n 1 on both periods' profits, the non-distressed firm's best-response quantity is q
, revealing that the non-distressed firm is less sensitive to the distressed firm's quantity as δ n increases. This is because, as q d 1 increases above the the no-distress benchmark, it reduces the distressed firm's first-period profit, hence increases its bankruptcy probability, and benefits the non-distressed competitor in the second period. Alternatively, q n 1 can be seen as a (convex) linear combination of the quantity from a simultaneously-move game (
and that from a game where the non-distressed firm is the Stackelberg leader or a monopolist seller (
). That is, as bankruptcy risk increases or reorganization becomes more costly, the non-distressed firm behaves more and more like a monopolist seller or as if it has the first-mover advantage. In this sense, the predatory behavior seeking to benefit from possible liquidation can actually become a competitive advantage for the non-distressed firm before bankruptcy.
Further analysis shows that, due to the predation effect, the distressed firm's order quantity (q d 1 ) and its first-period profit (π d 1 ) in equilibrium are less than the no-distress benchmark and that this damage may be more significant than the actual bankruptcy.
10 On the other hand, in equilibrium, the non-distressed firm produces more than the no-distress benchmark, consistent with the empirical findings in Chevalier (1995) that highly levered supermarkets face more intense competition as competitors attempt to benefit from the levered firms' financial vulnerability. The increase in q n 1 over-compensates for the decrease in q d 1 , leading to a higher aggregated supply to customers, and the above deviations grow as reorganization becomes more costly. Moreover, the non-distressed firm's first-period profit may be greater than the no-distressed benchmark. This confirms that even though the predation effect originates from the non-distressed firm's motive to increase profit after bankruptcy, it can also benefit the non-distressed firm even before bankruptcy.
The predation effect has a mixed impact on consumers. While consumers are hurt in the event of liquidation, they benefit in the first period from more intense competition. As shown in Figure   2 , when bankruptcy risk is low, the first-period benefit dominates; hence, consumers benefit more from more costly reorganization. As bankruptcy risk grows, the second-period damage grows and less costly reorganization becomes favorable. . The x-axis is the probability of liquidation (1 − Φ), which is endogenously determined by the cost of reorganization.
The above dynamics can also be interpreted in a different setting. Imagine two firms based in two different countries competing in a global market. For example, both American Airlines and Virgin
Atlantic operate the same transatlantic routes. While both could be financially distressed, they are homed in jurisdictions with different costs of reorganization. As an approximation, suppose one operates in a jurisdiction where reorganization is costless; the other in a jurisdiction where reorganization is more costly. As our model suggests, the firm with costless reorganization behaves as the non-distressed competitor, and the above results suggest that it has a competitive advantage over the other firm. In this sense, a country that is more friendly toward reorganization could provide its companies with a legal advantage in global competition.
The Bail-out Effect and Negative Externality
As shown in the previous section, when the supply prices do not depend on the firms' financial situation, the distressed firm's bankruptcy always hurts itself and benefits the competitor. However, do these results continue to hold as the supplier has more pricing power and can adjust the wholesale prices in response to the firm's financial situation? Further, how is the supplier's profitability affected when one of its customers faces bankruptcy risk? The next two sections answer these questions under the endogenous differentiated pricing case, focusing on the in-bankruptcy decisions in this section and pre-bankruptcy decisions in Section 6.
When the distressed firm is in bankruptcy, to decide the wholesale contracts offered in reorganization, the supplier needs to evaluate its outside option, that is, its profit when the bankrupt firm is liquidated: π 
Note that, as revealed by the supplier's maximand G(π shares some similarities with the Nash product in a Nash bargaining solution where π s r is the payoff to the supplier when reorganization succeeds, and π s l is its outside option, and G(π d r ) can be seen as the bankrupt firm's "utility". In this sense, the uncertainty in reorganization gives the bankrupt firm more "bargaining power" against its supplier, leading to higher supply chain efficiency as measured by total quantity in reorganization. Indeed, Proposition 2 dictates that w
That is, to reduce the probability of being left with a monopsony buyer, the supplier is willing to lower the bankrupt firm's wholesale price, creating the bail-out effect. On the other hand, note that w n r = µ 2 2 = w n c = w n l . That is, the second-period wholesale price offered to the non-distressed firm is independent of the financial situation of the distressed firm. Therefore, its competitor's bankruptcy does not influence the non-distressed firm's wholesale price directly. However, w Figure 3(a) shows that the probability of reorganization decreases in the cost of reorganization, suggesting that even though the supplier grants more concessions as reorganization becomes costly, the growth of these concessions does not keep pace with the reorganization cost. Further, Figure   3 (b) confirms that due to the negative externality, the competitor could actually be worse off compared with the no-distress benchmark, particularly when reorganization is less costly. The reason is as follows. Note that π s r is concave in π d r ; that is, the marginal cost of offering concession is low to the supplier when the concession is small. Therefore, when reorganization is less costly, the supplier can ensure a low probability of liquidation at a small cost, limiting the benefit to the non-distressed firm. On the other hand, as the non-distressed firm profit in reorganization, π n r , is decreasing and convex in π d r , the non-distressed firm is hurt (marginally) the most when the supplier grants less in concession. Combining the two effects, the harm to the non-distressed firm dominates the benefit when reorganization is less costly while, as the cost of reorganization increases (stochastically), the benefit becomes the dominating force.
Exclusivity and Suppliers as Creditors
Within industries where bankruptcy appears frequently, it is common that a major supplier is also a major creditor of the distressed firm. For example, in the retail industry, Circuit City relied on important electronics manufacturers such as Hewlett-Packard, Samsung, and Sony to supply both goods and financing.
11 The relationship between Borders and large publishers was similar. In addition, labor unions also tend to be large creditors of bankrupt firms. For instance, the UAW was one of the most important creditors in the bankruptcy of General Motors. Motivated by these examples, this section examines how the interaction of the operational and financial linkages between the supplier and the distressed firm influences the outcome of the reorganization. We focus on a specific rule in Chapter 11: exclusivity, which dictates that only the bankrupt firm can propose a reorganization plan which includes the amount paid to each creditor.
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Assume that at the time of bankruptcy, the bankrupt firm owes the supplier L s . Obviously, the payment received by the supplier cannot exceed L s . On the other hand, bankruptcy law requires that, in reorganization, all creditors need to receive no less than what they would receive in liquidation, which is normalized to zero without loss of generality. Therefore, when proposing a reorganization plan, the bankrupt firm chooses y The above result reveals that when the supplier is also a creditor of the bankrupt firm, the optimal reorganization plan leads to only one of two following scenarios: the supplier's financial claim is fully repaid or the wholesale price is reduced to the supplier's marginal cost. Compared to the case when the supplier is not a creditor, the additional financial linkage between the two parties further increases the likelihood of reorganization and supply chain efficiency. This result provides a possible explanation for why financing is commonly seen between supply chain partners.
To summarize, in bankruptcy, the supplier lowers the wholesale price of the bankrupt firm to improve the chance of reorganization, always lowering its own profit and possibly the profit of the non-distressed competitor. This recourse creates intricate behavior in the pre-bankruptcy period, which we discuss in the next section. For tractability, we confine the following sections to the base model where the supplier is not a creditor, which does not change our results qualitatively.
Balancing Three Supply Chain Effects
Moving to the pre-bankruptcy period, in the endogenous differentiated pricing case, the supplier chooses w These intuitive conjectures turn out not to be the case. In contrast, as shown in Proposition 5, the supplier's choice of optimal first-period wholesale prices is influenced by intricate dynamics between the three firms beyond the predation and bail-out effects. For notational convenience, we
as the second-order competitor impact, and δ M = δ s +ǫ n 1+δ n /2−ǫ n as the (scaled) total supplier impact, consisting of direct supplier impact (δ s ), and ǫ n , which, as shown later, can be interpreted as an indirect supplier impact.
Proposition 5. In the pre-bankruptcy period, the supplier offers wholesale prices:
where δ n and δ M are functions of π d 1 satisfying:
Correspondingly, the two downstream firms' quantities are q
To better understand the above results, we construct three hypothetical auxiliary scenarios to isolate different drivers behind the supplier's decisions. The first hypothetical scenario assumes that the competitor is myopic, that is, its objective in the first period is to maximize π n 1 . Obviously, this scenario leads to δ n = 0 and ǫ n = 0, allowing us to single out the bail-out effect (δ s < 0). This scenario confirms that the implication of the bail-out effect before bankruptcy is consistent with that in bankruptcy. Specifically, the supplier lowers the distressed firm's wholesale price w d 1 to lower the probability of bankruptcy and minimize the total bail-out cost. The non-distressed firm's wholesale price remains the same as the no-distress benchmark since the supplier has no incentive to deviate w n 1 from the no-distress benchmark when the non-distressed firm is myopic. However, facing a rival with lower cost, the non-distressed firm's first-period profit, π
(6+4δ s ) 2 , decreases as the bail-out effect is stronger. In summary, the bail-out effect benefits the distressed firm but hurts its competitor.
Similarly, assuming that the supplier is myopic, hence, only maximizing π s 1 , allows us to mute the bail-out effect (δ s = 0). We further consider two sub-scenarios. First, when |δ n | ≫ |ǫ n | ≈ 0, the predation effect is singled out. As
Recall that Section 4 concludes that the predation effect (δ n > 0) lends the non-distressed firm a competitive advantage before bankruptcy as its more aggressive best-response quantity leads to a larger market share. However, Proposition 5 shows that, with pricing power, the supplier can take advantage of this aggressive quantity response to adjust wholesale prices to balance the order quantities from the two downstream firms, leading to q 
That is, in the first period, the predation effect actually benefits the distressed firm and hurts the non-distressed firm. In this sense, with endogenous pricing, the predation effect smooths out the two downstream firms' profits over the two periods so that a second-period gain is always associated with first-period loss and vice versa. This is completely opposite to the passive pricing case where the non-distressed firm benefits in both periods. Finally, note that the supplier's first-period profit π 6−δ n , greater than the no-distress benchmark. That is, one customer's financial distress may be a positive externality to the supplier when downstream competition is present.
Last, consider the case in which ǫ n is significantly greater than δ n . By definition, ǫ n captures the changes in the predation effect. With ǫ n > 0, the predation effect becomes stronger as the bankruptcy risk increases (π d 1 decreases). Since the supplier benefits from a stronger predation effect, this effect provides an incentive to abet the non-distressed firm's predatory behavior by pushing the distressed firm into bankruptcy. In this sense, ǫ n reflects the impact of the distressed firm's bankruptcy on the supplier through an indirect channel, the non-distressed competitor, creating an indirect supplier impact as interpreted from the definition of δ M . This impact generates the third supply chain effect: the abetment effect. Indeed, for ǫ n > 0, the wholesale prices are
. That is, the supplier creates a cost disadvantage to the distressed firm. This leads to
(6−2ǫ n ) 2 = π n 1 , revealing that the abetment effect benefits the non-distressed firm but hurts the distressed firm. Finally, note that π
is less than the no-distress benchmark. Therefore, the abetment effect alone actually hurts the supplier. However, it benefits the supplier indirectly by strengthening the predation effect. This mechanism reveals a fundamental difference between the abetment effect and the bail-out and predation effects, both of which reflect the direct consequence of the distressed firm's bankruptcy. . Specifically, w n 1 is higher than the nodistress benchmark when the cost of reorganization is large and the non-distressed firm benefits in bankruptcy (δ n > 0) and lower when bankruptcy is a negative externality (δ n < 0). On the other hand, w d 1 is determined by balancing the bail-out effect and the abetment effect: when the cost of reorganization is low, the bail-out effect dominates; hence, the supplier has incentive to lower w d 1 . As reorganization becomes more costly, the abetment effect becomes more prominent; thus, the supplier starts to squeeze the distressed firm to induce a larger quantity from the non-distressed competitor. This result provides an explanation for why suppliers may not want to lower the price to a distressed buyer before bankruptcy, even though bankruptcy hurts the supplier directly. Figure 4(b) shows that the firm's probability of bankruptcy is sensitive to the cost of reorganization, ranging from 2% under costless reorganization to 10% when the cost of reorganization is prohibitively high. Further, the probability is not necessarily monotone in the cost. The trend is consistent with the cost difference between the two competitors (w Figure 4(a) . When the cost of reorganization is small, the probability of bankruptcy decreases with the cost of reorganization, as the bail-out effect dominates; however, the trend is reversed as reorganization becomes more costly and the abetment effect becomes more important. Notes. y-axes presented as the relative differences between the plotted quantity and the corresponding the no-distress benchmark.
As a result of the wholesale prices, the three firm's profits and consumer surplus are also influenced by the cost of reorganization, as shown in Figure 5 . First, note that as the cost of reorganization increases, the supplier benefits from the predation effect, while the competitor benefits from the abetment effect. The fact that the supplier's total profit could be higher than the no-distress benchmark again confirms that, in the presence of downstream competition, facing a distressed customer actually benefits the supplier. On the other hand, the distressed firm and consumers benefit when the cost of reorganization is relatively low (but not zero). This is because in this region the supplier grants more concessions to the distressed firm, and the lowered wholesale price and larger quantity are passed to consumers. The fact that a less costly reorganization could actually dominate costless reorganization is because the overall benefit of lower wholesale prices dominates the cost in bankruptcy, which includes the possibility of liquidation for consumers and the distressed firm and the cost of reorganization.
Uniform Pricing: The Power of Commitment
The last two sections show how the risk of bankruptcy and the cost of reorganization influence different parties' profitability when the supplier can charge different wholesale prices to the two firms. However, under certain circumstances, the supplier may prefer or be restricted to offer identical prices to both firms for various reasons. Competitors may also demand equal treatment when the distressed firm is in bankruptcy. For example, according to Milliot and Rosen (2011), during negotiations between Borders and major publishers when the bookstore chain was close to bankruptcy, its major competitor Barnes & Nobles raised questions about the fairness and demanded that publishers "offer the same terms to all booksellers." In this section, we examine how the supply chain dynamics change when such a uniform pricing constraint is imposed.
We again conduct the analysis backward in time. Similar to the actions in Section 5, in bankruptcy, the supplier chooses w r to maximize its surplus in reorganization over liquidation, 
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. Proposition 6. In bankruptcy, the supplier offers wholesale price w r = µ 2 − 3 √ x * , where
Compared with Proposition 2, the above result shows that the bankrupt firm receives less of a concession (smaller π d r ) under uniform pricing than under differentiated pricing, leading to a higher probability of liquidation. This is because the supplier faces larger costs to bail out the bankrupt firm as it loses the power of differentiating the two downstream firms in bankruptcy. Consequently, the competitor is always better off when the distressed firm files for bankruptcy. Moreover, compared with the no-distress benchmark, the non-distressed competitor actually benefits from the distressed firm's successful reorganization by free-riding the lower price faced by the bankrupt firm. Corollary 2 suggests that more costly reorganization inevitably generates a stronger predation effect. The supplier, on the other hand, facing higher costs in bankruptcy, also has a stronger incentive to bail out the firm in the first period.
Moving to the first-period decisions, as in the previous notation, we define δ Proposition 7. The optimal wholesale price under uniform pricing is:
where π 
Accordingly, π
Comparing Proposition 7 with Proposition 5, the first observation is that the optimal uniform price w 1 shares some similarity with w d 1 under the differentiated pricing case in that the bail-out effect and the abetment effect play the major roles in determining the optimal price: when the bail-out effect dominates the abetment effect, that is, ǫ s U > |δ s U |, w 1 is higher than the no-distress benchmark as the supplier increases w 1 to profit more from the non-distressed firm. This is confirmed in the case of σ = Under the optimal wholesale price contract, the three firms' profits are shown in Figure 7 (a).
Comparing these results with Figure 5 (a), three phenomenon stand out. First, the distressed firm's profit is lower than that in the differentiated pricing case especially as the cost of reorganization becomes large. This result is intuitive as uniform pricing increases the supplier's cost to bail out the distressed firm. Further, recall that in the differentiated pricing case, the predation effect leads to a cost advantage for the non-distressed firm. However, this advantage disappears due to the uniform pricing constraint. Instead, employing the hypothetical scenario that isolates the predation effect,
That is, the predation effect has a negative impact on the distressed firm's profit, reverting back to the passive supply scenario.
Considering the non-distressed firm's profit, despite the fair treatment it receives, the nondistressed competitor could face a lower profit than in the differentiated pricing case. This result is mainly driven by the higher wholesale price faced by the non-distressed firm.
Finally, even though the supplier loses its power to differentiate the two downstream buyers through pricing, it could earn more profit in the long run. As the uniform pricing constraint always hurts the supplier in bankruptcy, the benefit comes in the pre-bankruptcy period. This is because this constraint serves as a commitment to the non-distressed firm to be treated fairly in bankruptcy. This commitment in turn strengthens the predation effect. Employing the hypothetical scenario that isolates the predation effect (δ , increasing in δ n U . That is, a stronger predation effect benefits the supplier. As the numerical study shows, the benefit from this commitment dominates the in-bankruptcy harm, leading to an overall benefit to the supplier. This benefit, however, comes with a cost to consumers. As shown in Figure 7 (b), consumers Notes. Parameters used are the same as in Figure 5 . y-axis presented as the relative differences from the no-distress benchmark.
in general are hurt in the presence of bankruptcy risk, which follows for two reasons: first, in the pre-bankruptcy period, to benefit from the non-distressed firm's inflated demand, the supplier increases the first-period price, hurting consumers; second, in bankruptcy, it is more costly for the supplier to rescue the bankrupt firm, leading to a higher probability of liquidation, which also hurts consumers. In this sense, our model provides an additional explanation for the argument that price discrimination does not necessarily hurt consumers. Indeed, when the two downstream buyers are in different financial situations, treating the two firms differently can in fact benefit consumers.
Conclusion
Bankruptcy is an important business decision. With the possibility of reorganization, the bankrupt firm can be rehabilitated and re-emerge as a stronger competitor. The possibility of bankruptcy and the following reorganization has a significant impact on not only the firm that faces bankruptcy risk but also other operationally linked firms. In this paper, we focus on the mutual influence of bankruptcy risk and supply chain dynamics. We identify three supply chain effects of bankruptcy and find that they capture an intricate interplay among the different parties in the supply chain.
First, under the predation effect, the non-distressed firm competes aggressively before bankruptcy, forming an important source of indirect cost of financial distress to the distressed firm.
When supply price is less responsive to the firm's financial situation, this effect benefits the nondistressed firm before bankruptcy as the market share it gains over-compensates the margin loss.
However, a supplier with strong pricing power could take advantage of the competitor's inflated demand and extract this benefit. The supplier could further strengthen the predation effect and enjoy higher profit if it can credibly commit to uniform pricing in bankruptcy.
Second, the bail-out effect dictates that the supplier has the incentive to lower the distressed firm's wholesale price both before and after bankruptcy. This effect becomes stronger when the supplier is also a creditor of the distressed firm, justifying the exclusivity rule in Chapter 11.
Depending on whether the supplier can treat the two firms differently, the bail-out effect could hurt or benefit the non-distressed competitor. In this sense, one firm's bankruptcy could actually become a negative externality to its competitor.
Finally, the abetment effect arises from the supplier's incentive to profit more from the nondistressed firm. Consequently, the supplier creates a cost disadvantage to the distressed firm, helping the non-distressed firm to push the distressed firm into bankruptcy. This effect may explain why the supplier does not grant concessions to the buyer before bankruptcy but does so afterwards.
Depending on the relative strength of these effects, the possibility of bankruptcy could also benefit consumers by re-distributing the power between supply chain partners and intensifying competition. These effects, combined with their impact on firms' profitability, convey important policy implications. While previous research evaluates the efficiency of a bankruptcy mechanism within a firm, this paper shows that, when assessing this efficiency, it is important to take into consideration the responses and performance of other players in the supply chain. For example, when the interaction between the supplier and the competitor is strong, less costly reorganization is generally more efficient at the chain and consumer level; when the interaction is weak, more costly reorganization could benefit consumers and be more efficient at the societal level. Finally, as Section 7 shows, stripping the power of price differentiation from the supplier may actually hurt consumers, which provides an additional justification of the current trend of a restrictive interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act.
As a first attempt to study the impact of bankruptcy in the supply chain context, our paper is not without limitations. First, while we consider both the role played by the competitor and supplier, we do not model consumers' reactions to bankruptcy. Intuitively, sophisticated consumers could expect that a bankrupt firm produces goods of lower quality. Therefore, besides the predation effect, the demand faced by the distressed firm may also be influenced by consumers. Second, to focus on the operational strategies of different supply chain players, we treat reorganization as an instantaneous process. However, in practice, reorganization can be lengthy; hence, operational decisions within the process could be a promising research direction. Finally, we treat the firms' financial obligations as given and assume only one downstream firm is in distress. However, one may argue that all parties in the supply chain may choose an optimal financial structure according to the cost of reorganization and supply chain structure, and these endogenous leverage decisions remain as a question to be answered. 
